15, 1. What was argued? of Gal. Statement 67a-lOOa (Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and For Temporary Restraining Order). Id., at 472-473. 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause. If it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews, for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause. understood as anything other than an effort to "segregat[e] voters" on the basis of race. d. Suppose that patients in a certain control group are awake from 7 A.M. to 10 P.M. What is the average body temperature of such a patient over this wakeful period? Analogous Case. In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be. on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification." The logic of its theory appears to be that race-conscious redistricting that "segregates" by drawing odd-shaped lines is qualitatively different from race-conscious redistricting that affects groups in some other way. 3. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. wide, the majority concluded that appellants had failed to state an equal protection claim. It is ironic that it does so when white voters challenge a law that would have North Carolina send a black representative to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction, here is no constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity for districts. The balances for the accounts that follow appear in the Adjusted Trial Balance columns of the end-of-period spreadsheet. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. Robinson O. Everett argued the cause for appellants. But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. ); id., at 180, and n. (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment).3. John Paul . Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferi-. It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole. No analogous purpose or effect has been alleged in this case. The Court offers them no explanation of this paradox. Shaw v. Reno Jennifer Denise Rogers . Byron R. White White. 461, 476 (EDNC 1992) (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and a "bug splattered on a windshield," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1992, p. A14. The difference between constitutional and unconstitutional gerrymanders has nothing to do with whether they are based on assumptions about the groups they affect, but whether their purpose is to enhance the power of the group in control of the districting process at the expense of any minority group, and thereby to strengthen the unequal distribution of electoral power. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469 (1989) (city contracting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. ); id., at 179-180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). For the following sentence, locate the action verb and underline it twice. 1984); and, finally, the "concentration of [minority voters] into districts where they constitute an excessive majority," Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46, n. 11 (1986), also called "packing," Voinovich, supra, at 153. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. 642-649. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for. The Court has, in its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group. e., an intent to aggravate "the unequal distribution of electoral power." fications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." Laws, ch. Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. 1973). We hold only that, on the facts of this case, appellants have stated a claim sufficient to defeat the state appellees' motion to dismiss. More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. 1 It has been argued that the required showing of discriminatory effect should be lessened once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates intentional discrimination. (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. Centered in the northeast portion of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the South Carolina border. We previously have recognized a significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. Gomillion is consistent with this view. I nevertheless agree that the conscious use of race in redistricting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the effect of the redistricting plan is to deny a particular group equal access to the political process or to minimize its voting strength unduly. Supp., at 475-477 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. Again, in White v. Regester, supra, the same criteria were used to uphold the District Court's finding that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83-94 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 744-765 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 161-185 (1986) (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those "rare" statutes that, although race-neutral, are, on their face, "unexplainable on grounds other than race." We have made clear, however, that equal protection analysis "is not dependent. The majority, however, accepted the District Court's finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the districts were in fact drawn on racial lines. There is a characteristic coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose associated with the State's use of race in those situations in which it has immediately trig-. See ante, at 666-667, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion). Id., at 133 (emphasis added). Id., at 53-54. They also stated: "'Our argument is that the history of the area demonstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide the community at this time.'" We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. In other words, North Carolina was found by Congress to have" 'resorted to the extraordinary stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court decrees'" and therefore "would be likely to engage in 'similar maneuvers in the future in order to evade the remedies for voting discrimination contained in the Act itself.'" The plaintiffs in UJO-members of a Hasidic community split between two districts under New York's revised redistricting plan-did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. Disregard for geographic divisions and compactness often goes hand in hand with partisan gerrymandering. The only other case invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra. have insisted that members of the political or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the political process.1 Although this severe burden has limited the number of successful suits, it was adopted for sound reasons. Although the State argues that it had a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was warranted, only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the Act's requirements and without regard for sound districting principles. See App. 6 In this regard, I agree with JUSTICE WHITE'S assessment of the difficulty the white plaintiffs would have here in showing that their opportunity to participate equally in North Carolina's electoral process has been unconstitutionally diminished. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Geographically, the State divides into three regions: the eastern Coastal Plain, the central Piedmont Plateau, and the western mountains. The distinction is without foundation. JUSTICE WHITE WITH WHOM JUSTICE BLACKMUN AND JUSTICE STEVENS JOIN, DISSENTING. App. As we explained in Feeney: "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. NO racial gerrymandering; race cannot be the sole or predominant factor in redrawing legislative boundaries; majority-minority districts. Two judges also concluded that, to the extent appellants challenged the Attorney General's preclearance decisions, their claim was foreclosed by this Court's holding in Morris v. Gressette, 432 U. S. 491 (1977). where t(0t24)t(0 \leq t \leq 24)t(0t24) is the number of hours past midnight. Race in redistricting is permissible as long as configurations are not too extreme, ch 7 part 2 prep pronouns and demonstratives, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole, Government in America: Elections and Updates Edition, George C. Edwards III, Martin P. Wattenberg, Robert L. Lineberry. c. Answer the questions in part (b) for the minimum body temperature during the 24-hour period. Supp., at 472. As Justice Douglas explained in his dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller nearly 30 years ago: "Here the individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The second majority-black district, District 12, is even more unusually shaped. The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. See ante, at 661-663, 669-670.6. One of the lower court judges described it as winding in a snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobbled up enough enclaves of black neighborhoods to create a majority-black district. See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). App. One need look no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. A second distinction between districting and most other governmental decisions in which race has figured is that those other decisions using racial criteria characteristically occur in circumstances in which the use of race to the advantage of one person is necessarily at the obvious expense of a member of a different race. Pleading such an element, the Court holds, suffices without a further allegation of harm, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Beer, we held that a reapportionment plan that created one majorityminority district where none existed before passed muster under 5 because it improved the position of racial minorities. See 478 U. S., at 131, n. 12 (plurality opinion). the purchase to her American Express card. Bush administration rejected this plan on the grounds that it gave blacks insufficient congressional representation. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). 75-104, p. 6, n. 6) (emphasis in original). of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277-278 (plurality opinion). to Juris. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) (emphasis added). These arguments were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. Such districting might have both the intent and effect of "packing" members of the group so as to deprive them of any influence in other districts. Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future. The North Carolina Republican Party and individual voters brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the plan constituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander under Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109 (1986). William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist. What is the immediate change Following is the case brief for Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) Case Summary of Shaw v. Reno: The State of North Carolina, in response to the U.S. Attorney General's objection that it had only one majority-black congressional district, created a second majority-black district. It may be that the terms for pleading this cause of action will be met so rarely that this case will wind up an aberration. 506 U. S. 801 (1992). To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. UJO set forth a standard under which white voters can establish unconstitutional vote dilution. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. Id., at 139. of Gal. See 42 U. S. C. 1973c (neither a declaratory judgment by the District Court for the District of Columbia nor preclearance by the Attorney General "shall bar a subsequent action to enjoin enforcement" of new voting practice); Allen, 393 U. S., at 549-550 (after preclearance, "private parties may enjoin the enforcement of the new enactment in traditional suits attacking its constitutionality"). It is against this background that we confront the questions presented here. To comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, North Carolina submitted a congressional reapportionment plan with one majority-black district to the U.S. Attorney General. United States Supreme Court. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46-51 (1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place,l legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.2 One need look. But their loose and imprecise use by today's majority has, I fear, led it astray. Such evidence will always be useful in cases that lack other evidence of invidious intent. The Court reasoned: "If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." See App. Cf. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. By a 2-to-1 vote, the District Court also dismissed the complaint against the state appellees. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. Dissenting Opinion. 92-357. In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily--without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society."Reynolds v. Sims[1964]. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. Bolling, The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently from other districting claims.9 The only justification I. tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. SHAW et al. Cf. Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. In fact, our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting-as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race, see supra, at 642-644-would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. 1237, 1261, n. 96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 752, n. 18 (1973)-but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. Because the State's purpose here was to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and because the General Assembly's plan did not lead to proportional underrepresentation of white voters state-. 2 It should be noted that 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any State to impose specified devices or procedures that result in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. In other words, the purposeful creation of a majority-minority district could have discriminatory effect if it is achieved by means of "packing"-i. e., overconcentration of minority voters. The Court has abandoned settled law to decide this case. See ante, at 647. Here, the Attorney General objected to the State's plan on the ground that it failed to draw a second majority-minority district for what appeared to be pretextual reasons. Although I disagree with the holding that appellants' claim is cognizable, the Court's discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. SHAW v. RENO (1993) AP U.S. Government and Politics Study Guide IMPACT The decision in Shaw v. Reno led to nationwide changes after the 2000 Census. You're all set! Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, consti-. v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979). It involves, instead, an attempt to equalize treatment, and to provide minority voters with an effective voice in the political process. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, No. -dividing voters into districts bc of race is segregation. Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been "segregated"-i. e., "set apart" or "isolate[d]." Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. 5-4 decision for Shaw majority opinion by Sandra Day O'Connor. I join JUSTICE WHITE'S dissenting opinion. In response, the state legislature revised the plan in a way that created two districts (the First and the Twelfth) that would have a majority of black voters. 376 U. S., at 66-67. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. Regents of Univ. to Juris. U. S. Redistricters have to justify themselves. Part of the explanation for the majority's approach has to do, perhaps, with the emotions stirred by words such as "segregation" and "political apartheid." UJO, supra, at 151-152. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Appellants' racial gerrymandering claims must be examined against the backdrop of this country's long history of racial discrimination in voting. 14, 1. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Classifications of citizens on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. The state appellees submit that two pieces of evidence gave the General Assembly a strong basis for believing that remedial action was warranted here: the Attorney General's imposition of the 5 preclearance requirement on 40 North Carolina counties, and the Gingles District Court's findings of a long history of official racial discrimination in North Carolina's political system and of pervasive racial bloc voting. See, e. g., Croson, 488 U. S., at 491-493 (opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, J. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second district. In 1993, about 20% of the state population identified as Black. App. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. Id., at 342-348. The State's revised plan contained a second majority-black district in the north-central region. The majority's contrary view is perplexing in light of its concession that "compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." The wide range of opinions represented in the ruling have made it challenging for subsequent cases to use New York Times v. United States as precedent. In determining whether a use of race is permissible in cases in which there is a bizarrely shaped district, we can readily look to its effects, just as we would in evaluating any other electoral districting scheme. Id., at 180 (Stewart, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in judgment). BLACKMUN, J., post, p. 676, STEVENS, J., post, p. 676, and SOUTER, J., post, p. 679, filed dissenting opinions. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. in M1 and M2? The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization - North Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional . But as JUSTICE WHITE points out, see ante, at 672 (dissenting opinion), and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 647, we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). Where members of a racial minority group vote as a cohesive unit, practices such as multimember or atlarge electoral systems can reduce or nullify minority voters' ability, as a group, "to elect the candidate of their choice." White v. Regester, supra, at 766. Ante, at 652. No inquiry into legislative purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears on the face of the statute. See, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339,341. The Attorney General did not object to the General Assembly's revised plan. UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of racial equality. tion. Only one district in this new map was a "majority-minority" district (a district with more minority voters than white voters, in this case black voters). UJO, supra, at 150. 1. for a remand at all, even accepting the majority's basic approach to this case. Appellants point out that blacks currently hold the positions of State Auditor, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Accordingly, they held that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Redistricting plans also reflect group interests and inevitably are conceived with partisan aims in mind. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. Writing for three Members of the Court, I justified this conclusion as follows: "It is true that New York deliberately increased the nonwhite majorities in certain districts in order to enhance the opportunity for election of nonwhite representatives from those districts. Supp., at 472-473. I add these comments to emphasize that the two critical facts in this case are undisputed: First, the shape of District 12 is so bizarre that it must have been drawn for the purpose of either advantaging or disadvantaging a cognizable group of voters; and, second, regardless of that shape, it was drawn for the purpose of facilitating the election of a second black representative from North Carolina. Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. See Reynolds, 377 U. S., at 578 (recognizing these as legitimate state interests). Is it more "narrowly tailored" to create an irregular majority-minority district as opposed to one that is compact but harms other state interests such as incumbency protection or the representation of rural interests? Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circumstances in which a State might otherwise consciously consider race. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that a second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. Summarize, comment on, and the western mountains where t ( 0t24 ) is number. By our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny 569 ( 1969 ) ( emphasis original. 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